2010 Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) Conference Papers

Cross Domain Rule Set Verification Tools and Process Improvements

• I/ITSEC Paper #: 10042
• Author(s):
• Lance Call, AFRL
• Kelly Djahandari, Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Martin Liedy, Cobham Analytic Solutions
• Charles McElveen, Cobham Analytic Solutions

Abstract (Download Paper) (PDF - 971 KB) - (22 Jun 11)

In the Team Mission Training Environment, the primary training goal is to promote pilot and crew station readiness. One of the key ingredients in achieving this goal is a well designed Cross Domain Rule Set that minimizes limitations on data flowing between security domains; therefore, allowing for more effective and realistic training over the Combat Air Force (CAF) Distributed Mission Operations Network (DMON). The key to developing a well designed Cross Domain Rule Set is verification of the simulation traffic processed by the Cross Domain Solution. Verification of a Rule Set is a complex and time consuming process. Complicating factors include the volume of simulation traffic and the intricacies of the Rule Set. In the past, the process of analyzing simulation traffic processed by the Cross Domain Solution has been a manually intensive process that required many hours of analysis that introduced possible margins for error. A manual process is not an acceptable method since this analysis is performed many times for an applied Rule Set to ensure that the Rule Set is functioning as required by the Designated Approving Authority.

This paper reports on solutions and tools that address this verification problem and the process improvements that have been achieved from lessons learned. This paper describes the Event Analysis Tool (EAT), an automated tool used to streamline the simulation traffic verification process, and the Air Force Research Laboratory developed visualization tool that allows users to verify that data is being filtered according to the applied Cross Domain Rule Set. These tools greatly speed up the Rule Set verification process and help to identify residual inference risks.

Cross Domain Solution Configuration Management in the Simulation Training Environment

• I/ITSEC Paper #: 10049
• Author(s):
• Bonnie Page Danner, Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Heath T. Morton, USAF AFMC 677 AESG/SYCB

Abstract (Download Paper) (PDF - 1.40 KB) - (22 Jun 11)

The implementation of Combat Air Force (CAF) Distributed Mission Operation (DMO) cross domain solutions (CDS) in the dynamic world of simulation training introduces new and significant management challenges. One key challenge is the maintenance of cross domain solution security assurance and the associated approvals to operate in an environment where changes to mission training centers (MTCs), network infrastructure, participant sites, security classification guides, and training requirements are the norm. The effects of these changes on the approvals to operate the CDS can range from a requirement for re-accreditation with significant impact to little or no impact.

This paper describes the development and practice of configuration management for CDS in the DMO training environment. It provides an overview of the initial plans for implementing a CDS configuration management process involving key stakeholders participating in a review board. This paper addresses early lessons learned and describes an evolutionary process which is still being worked to improve and streamline the overall approach to configuration management. The CDS configuration controls required for secure operations in a constantly changing environment are complex, but essential for protection level 3 accreditation maintenance. A major challenge described in this paper is how to achieve clear understandings with stakeholders to help balance the need for retesting cross domain solutions for security approval maintenance and still meet the warfighter needs for daily training. This paper presents some of the configuration control issues, resolutions, and remaining challenges for CDS in the mission training environment.

Distributed Synchronized Playback Protocol and Implementation

• I/ITSEC Paper #: 10461
• Author(s):
• Lacey Ashkar, Cobham Analytic Solutions
• Ty Knight, Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Terry McDermott, Cobham Analytic Solutions
• Randy Pitz, The Boeing Company

Abstract (Download Paper) (PDF - 521 KB) - (22 Jun 11)

Critique and review are critical to the training process. When the training audience is scattered geographically, as happens with distributed simulation based training, new challenges are faced to provide commonly expected review tools. One important feature of military simulation-based training is the ability to play back the action from a just completed training event to support review and evaluation. Playback capability is common in virtual simulator facilities, but presents new challenges in a distributed training environment. Retransmitting recorded data to all sites from a recording site is subject to several criticisms: cost of bandwidth; special configuration of the playback site, potential security issues; and problems maintaining privacy of "local" data. Voice coordinated playback across sites suffers from distractions due to human error and communication problems often resulting in reduced synchronization and wasted time. To overcome all these drawbacks, the Combat Air Force Distributed Mission Operations (CAF DMO) program is pursuing a solution to distributed playback based on the Distributed Debrief Control Protocol (DDCP) recently offered to the simulation community by The Boeing Company. This open protocol is designed to enable the synchronous playback of data recorded in a simulation based event while not requiring recorded data to be retransmitted. CAF DMO is standardizing on the application of the DDCP protocol, tailored toward ensuring interoperability of control programs and playback device programs developed by different vendors. Software conforming to the tailored protocol has been developed and demonstrated that allows centralized, remote control over devices playing back video, simulation data and other information in any combination. This paper summarizes the CAF DMO decision to use DDCP and the tailoring done to achieve standardization

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Implications of Interoperating with Non-Hierarchical Security Domains

• I/ITSEC Paper #: 10041
• Author(s):
• Kelly Djahandari, Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Dr. Tony Valle, Cobham Analytic Solutions

Abstract (Download Paper) (PDF - 810 KB) - (22 Jun 11)

To date, Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) systems have usually been employed to protect information in a "high" security domain from being accessed by systems or individuals in a "low" security domain. This common situation is a case of hierarchical domains in that from a security policy perspective, the high side can have unrestricted access to all the information on the low side. As a result, the CDS usually employs a "pass all" rule set that permits all the low side information to flow freely while restricting the high side information that passes to the low side.

This paper considers the case of non-hierarchical domains in which there is no unambiguous high side or low side, but rather two domains, each of which contains information that must be restricted from the other, but both also have common information that must be shared to allow for interoperability. The policy implications are numerous: is a single CDS device sufficient, or are two required? Can a rule set be constructed that can physically reside in one or both domains or is a third location required to comply with security policy? How can the common domain be defined in general? How can Operation Security (OPSEC) rules be defined in such a way to allow participants in each domain to be properly briefed? If battlespace content restrictions are to be imposed, how can the "master" site be defined to enforce them and how can scenario development be done by the domain participants without revealing inference to one another? We discuss each of these implications by showing how they fall into general cases, provide guidance on identifying the appropriate case for any specific instance, and describe what solutions are available to accommodate them.

Space Capabilities in Joint Training

• I/ITSEC Paper #: 10145
• Author(s):
• Michael Aldinger, Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Jayesh Limbachia, Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Kristopher Washburn, Wyle Information Systems

Abstract (Download Paper) (PDF - 462 KB) - (22 Jun 11)

The vision for DMO is to enable warfighters to train, mission rehearse, and operate in large Composite/Joint/Combined Force packages with horizontal and vertical integration in a distributed full-spectrum Live-Virtual-Constructive battlespace. Space assets are force multipliers across the spectrum of conflict and must be integrated into deliberate and crisis action planning, as well as operations planning, combat operations, and time sensitive targeting (TST) to ensure timeliness of effects. To fully exploit the air, space, and information realms across the full spectrum of engagement, warfighters should understand how the synergistic application of space based systems, air platforms, and C4I can achieve rapid dominance in all three arenas, and victory over adversaries. A DMO-Space architecture is currently being implemented that will provide the ability to both train the space crews in a dynamic battlespace and realistically assess the impact of degraded space effects on warfighting capabilities. DMO-Space will also provide a capability to perform trades of space systems with terrestrial alternatives and future space concepts.

This paper will discuss the successes and challenges experienced in the development of a standard-based GPS jamming capability to support both distributed operational and tactical training events. The culmination of this effort is a GPS Jamming federation demonstration which implements the updated FOM and interoperability standards necessary for implementation of a real-time, high-fidelity, GPS jamming capability. Discussion will include the impact of both JNTC and DMT training needs on battlespace fidelity and content as well as the rationale for the design decisions that were made in defining the GPS Jamming federation and associated Federation Agreements/Standards. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the potential for use of other space capabilities to support enhanced warfighter training.

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